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GOD'S NATURE AND THE RATIONALITY OF
RELIGIOUS BELIEF
Chris Eberle

If something like Reformed Epistemology is correct, an agent is innocent in
regarding certain ways of forming beliefs to be reliable until those ways have
been proven guilty. An important species of argument purporting to show
guilt (1) identifies the ways of forming beliefs at the core of our cognitive activity, (2) isolates the features of our core practices which account for their reliability, and (3) determines whether or not peripheral practices which ought to
have those features enjoy at least their functional equivalents. An example.
Sense perception is at the heart of our cognitive activity; a feature of sense-perception which provides us with confidence in its reliability is that we can subject sense-perceptual beliefs to intersubjective criticism - others can check our
beliefs. Beliefs about God formed on the basis of religious experience cannot
be so checked and therefore lack positive epistemic status.
An important response to such criticism consists of arguing that the difference between two ways of forming beliefs is just what we should expect given
some relevant difference between the subject matters of those two ways of
forming beliefs. This species of response employs what I call 'the Ontological
Principle,' viz., that the nature or characteristics of an object constrain the way
an agent ought to form beliefs about that object.
In this paper, I attempt to provide a rationale for the Ontological Principle.
I argue as follows. Any epistemic norm which requires of an agent that she
enter into causal relations with an object which she cannot in the 'nature' of
the case enter lacks epistemic merit - it violates the ought implies can dictum.
Because the epistemic norms properly governing the cognitive activity of a
given agent are constrained by the causal relations possible between an agent
and an object of belief, and because the causal relations possible between an
object of belief and an agent are determined in part by the characteristics of the
object of belief, the epistemic norms properly governing the cognitive activity
of a given agent are determined in part by the characteristics of the object of
belief. That is, the Ontological Principle is true.

I

"Reformed Epistemologists" Plantinga, Alston and Wolterstorff have
argued, successfully by my lights, for the following position. (1) Every
cognitive agent cannot but rely on a set of belief-forming practices, e.g.,
sense-perception, introspection, memory and testimony, for which she can
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provide no non-circular discursive justification. (2) The most powerful and
venerable set of restrictions demarcating the belief-forming practices which
require discursive redemption from those which do not, viz., classical
foundationalism, is self- referentially incoherent, unduly restrictive, or
arbitrary. (3) Once the vicissitudes of classical foundationalism are
exposed, there is no reason why a religious way of forming beliefs ought
not count as one of those practices in which an agent may engage without
providing discursive justification for so doing. Religious practices of forming beliefs enjoy a presumptive innocence. (4) That a belief-forming practice
enjoys a presumptive innocence does not insure those who engage in that
practice of "diplomatic immunity" from critical reflection; rather, critical
reflection assumes the burden of a proof of guilt. Religious practices of
forming beliefs are innocent until proven guilty.
Critics frequently attempt to show guilt by comparison criticism. The
structure of comparison criticism is as follows (we will attend to some of
the content shortly). Consider two practices, Alpha and Beta. Suppose
that we are justly confident of Beta's trustworthiness, that it gives rise to a
sufficiently high proportion of true to false beliefs. We have identified various epistemic excellences which Beta possesses and are justly confident
that its possession of those excellences accounts for Beta's providing us
with access to reality. Alpha, however, lacks one of those excellences, E, or
any functionally equivalent excellence for E. If both Alpha and Beta ought
to have some such excellence, we infer (ceteris paribus) that the epistemic
status Alpha enjoys is lower than that enjoyed by Beta; and if E is a particularly important property, we may conclude that Alpha enjoys no positive
epistemic status whatsoever. In short, by comparing what we know about
the kinds of activities that put one in touch with the truth with what we
know about the way in which practitioners of Alpha form beliefs, we
attempt to determine whether or not forming beliefs in the Alpha-type
way is a good thing from the epistemic point of view.
Comparison criticism is an important species of argumentation,' particularly if the Reformed strategy (or some relevantly similar strategy) is ultimately defensible. Why? Comparison criticism enables us to engage in
critical reflection in a principled manner even given the limitations
imposed on us by our inability to attain a Cod's-eye view of our epistemic
situation. One who levels such a critique is free to admit what many proponents of "naturalistic epistemology" have been urging, viz., that none
of us has any idea of the features of a practice that facilitate reliable belief
formation other than by engaging in actual ways of forming beliefs. By
engaging in ways of forming beliefs to which we cannot but impute a presumptive innocence, we are able to acquire some understanding of how
we can come into contact with reality. We may subsequently employ that
understanding to criticize other ways of forming beliefs.
Unfortunately, comparison criticism harbors potential for the uncritical rejection of legitimate practices of forming beliefs. The crucial problem for any such criticism is to show of an excellence E internal to one
practice that another practice which in fact lacks E ought to have E.
Although E may be crucial to one practice's capacity to put an agent in
touch with reality, the very same excellence may be superfluous or even

Faith and Philosophy

154

counterproductive for a different practice. To reject the latter practice
because it lacks E would be a travesty.
Many religious apologists attempt to defuse comparison criticism by
articulating what they take to be the epistemic constraints imposed on
an agent by the nature of that about which they form beliefs. They
appeal, in short, to what I shall call the Ontological Principle, viz., that
the way in which we form beliefs about an object ought to be constrained by the nature of that object. Whether or not we ought to require
of a given practice that it have some excellence E depends, in part, on
the nature of that about which members of that practice form beliefs.
Now the Ontological Principle has a great deal of intuitive plausibility
and, as a consequence, those who employ it do not, apparently, believe
that they need to justify that principle. I will attempt to remedy that
oversight in this essay.
The path we will travel to get to that point, however, will be somewhat circuitous. In the next section, I articulate a familiar comparison
criticism of a very common religious belief-forming practice, viz., that of
forming beliefs about God on the basis of "religious experience." In the
third section, I will relate a powerful response to that criticism, one
which essentially employs the Ontological Principle. In section four, I
explain what I mean by that principle and then, in section five, provide
several illustrations intended to motivate interest in that principle. Only
in the sixth and seventh sections do I provide reason to believe that it is
true. In section eight, I return to the topic of comparison criticism and
attempt to identify the promising strategy the Ontological Principle
holds for the religious apologist faced with such a criticism. And in a
concluding section, I mention several issues I fail to resolve in the ensuing discussion.
II

William Alston claims that there is a way of forming beliefs, mystical
perception, in which "the experience, or as I shall say, the perception of
God, plays a role with respect to beliefs about God importantly analogous to that played by sense-perception with respect to beliefs about the
physical world." 2 Mystical Perception (MP) is a socially established way
of forming beliefs about God on the basis of putative manifestations of
God to the believer; MP is what Alston calls a doxastic practice (DP). A
doxastic practice is constituted both by a family of dispositions to form
beliefs with a certain content upon being in a certain kind of mental state
as well as a set of beliefs and procedures by which an agent may determine whether beliefs with initial credibility deserve continued adherence. (Alston calls this latter feature of a doxastic practice its overrider
system.) Following the Reformed strategy, Alston argues that MP enjoys
the presumptive innocence we have no reason not to accord to any and
every fundamental way of forming beliefs. Each human being forms
beliefs by engaging in the standard package of sense-perception, introspection, rational intuition, and memory; we have as yet no sound, noncircular argument which shows that any of those basic practices are reli-
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able; and yet we are epistemically justified in regarding them as reliable
so long as we have no reason to think otherwise. Similarly for MP; any
agent who engages in MP is entitled to regard it as reliable without
argument unless provided with reason to regard it as unreliable.
And attempts to prove its guilt are certainly forthcoming. Consider
the following. Alston denies that perception of God is self-authenticating, incorrigible, indubitable, or any other property of that ilk. Any DP
worth its salt is one in which agents are capable of determining whether
or not grounds which ordinarily indicate the truth of some belief do, in
this instance, so indicate. Because our beliefs are defeasible, every legitimate DP must allow for the distinction between prima facie and ultima
facie justification. In order for an agent so to distinguish, she needs to
have at her disposal tests whereby beliefs with initial credibility (prima
facie justification) may be checked for justification all things considered
(ultima facie justification). That is, every DP must, on pain of epistemic
illegitimacy, enjoy an adequate overrider system.
Various critics of MP argue that its overrider system is not an adequate means for evaluating manifestation beliefs (or M-beliefs, those
formed on the basis of a putative manifestation of God to the believer).3
Why? Compare it to the overrider system of a DP at the core of our cognitive activity and which we are compelled to regard as reliable.
Consider sense-perception's (SP) overrider system, as it relates to checking the reports of others that they have perceived some object. When an
agent claims to have seen a snark in the woods, we have means of checking her assertion: we follow her trail back to the place where she claimed
to have seen the snark, search for evidence of snarks (footprints, stoot
cigarette butts, etc.), and make our determination on the basis of what
any of us can discern. If her story fails to check out after the appropriate
kind of investigation, then we regard her assertion as false, and the
utterer of that assertion as deceptive, deluded, mistaken, credulous, etc.
Our confidence in making that judgment is based on the fact that the
objects of SP are publicly available, i.e., that which one agent claims to
have perceived is perceivable (in principle) by any of us and by our
employing the same cognitive faculties she would have had to employ
were she to have perceived a snark. Because the objects of SP are publicly available, all who engage in SP can in principle agree upon the conditions in which it is possible to perceive them. And because the conditions in which it is possible to perceive objects may be determined by
any practitioner of SP, claims about those objects are intersubjectively
evaluable. Anyone can evaluate sense-perceptual claims and can evaluate them by appeal to criteria everyone can agree on. In short, because
we can "specify conditions under which the experience of one subject is
relevant to the confirmation or disconfirmation of the perceptual report
of another subject/' we are able to engage "in the critical examination of
sense-perceptual reports."4
That sense-perceptual beliefs are inter subjectively evaluable substantiates our confidence in the presumptive innocence of SP. Why? The
heart of the answer is simple: human beings are fallible; by having other
agents check our assertions, agents who may lack our particular epis-
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temic vices, we raise the probability that a given perceptual belief is true.
The public availability of the objects of perception renders us able more
adequately to assess the beliefs formed about those objects, and thus
increases our confidence in the truth of particular judgments. If, for this
reason, we are rightly confident of most of the judgments we make by
engaging in SP, we are rightly confident of SP's reliability.
Obviously, those who engage in MP enjoy no such intersubjective
evaluation of M- beliefs. Why? Because God is not available under conditions participants in MP may determine as those in which an agent
typically perceives God. We have no idea under what conditions God
presents himself to an agent's consciousness, and therefore have no idea
where, when, and how God manifests himself, and therefore cannot disconfirm an agent's claim that this has in fact happened. And this counts
against the epistemic standing of MP: the lack of adequate checks to Mbelief formation renders MP suspect.
Clearly, the objection with which Alston is concerned is a species of
comparison criticism. Those who engage in MP cannot subject their Mbeliefs to intersubjective evaluation, whereas those who engage in SP
can. That our sense-perceptual beliefs can be subjected to intersubjective
criticism - not to mention that they routinely are and come off pretty
well on the whole - confirms the confidence we initially place in its
reliability. That M-beliefs are not so subject, and that they lack any functional equivalent for intersubjective criticism, renders MP suspect.
III

As I noted previously, the vulnerable step in a comparison criticism
will be the claim that a DP which lacks a given feature must have that
feature in order to enjoy positive epistemic status. Alston's response
focuses on just that step. The objection, according to Alston, is a "glaring example of epistemic imperialism."s The critic proposes to impose
on agents who engage in MP procedures for checking beliefs properly
required only of SP.
The crucial point is the following. In order to determine which procedures are appropriate for the overrider system of a given DP, one cannot
but appeal to the beliefs already formed via that practice. For example,
there is no way to determine a priori which procedures will allow us to
check beliefs formed about the natural environment without relying on
our prior knowledge of what the natural world is like. As a consequence of engaging in SP, we learn that the natural environment is composed of enduring physical objects which casually interact with other
physical objects in a lawlike manner. Because we have acquired knowledge of the regularities exhibited by objects in the natural environment,
we may therefore isolate the conditions in which it is possible for a given
agent to perceive a given object. And having learned that, we justifiably
judge that the intersubjective evaluability of claims about the objects of
sense perception is a sine qua non of any genuine practice of forming
beliefs about the natural world. In short, according to Alston, "it is on
the basis of what SP has revealed to us about the nature of its subject

RATIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

157

matter that we take its deliverances to be subject to assessment in terms
of the perceptions of properly qualified others./1 6
Just as with SP, those who engage in MP cannot but, and, therefore, may,legitimately employ that practice to construct an understanding of its subject matter in
order to determine what may appropriately be required of their practice's overrider system. Determining what tests are required in order to corroborate or to
discredit M-beliefs is a circular process: agents form an understanding of God's
nature and purposes, as well as the way He interacts with those who perceive
Him, and on the basis of that understanding formulate procedures for checking
M- beliefs. These procedures are subsequently employed to evaluate the Mbeliefs of those who engage in MP and, indeed, perhaps those very beliefs on the
basis of which a given procedure was deemed appropriate.
Of what relevance is this to the objection at hand? The understanding
of God internal to MP is that of a sovereign, immaterial being who presents Himself non-sensorily and (for all we can tell) non-systematically
to human beings. While the beliefs formed on the basis of those perceptions reveal that God possesses enduring virtues like compassion and
justice, they reveal no dependable regularities in the way God interacts
with human beings which render possible predictions of divine manifestations. Indeed, the understanding of God internal to MP provides those
who engage in that practice with reason to believe that God's action
exhibits no regularities of the sort proper to SP and thus no basis for predictions. Therefore, our being unable to test M- beliefs in the manner
appropriate to SP cannot count as a good reason to regard it as unreliable. Rather, the understanding of God internal to MP warrants us in
regarding this objection as imperialistic. Alston concludes:
The upshot of all this is that while what we have learned about
the physical world from SP gives us the wherewithal to hold
particular perceptual reports subject to a decisive test in terms of
what relevant others perceive, what we have learned from God
and His relations to His creation, from [MP] and other sources,
gives us reason to suppose that no such tests are available here. 7
IV

Alston's response employs what I have found to be a fairly common
tactic amongst religious apologists. Alston appeals to what I have called
The Ontological Principle: the nature of God differs from the nature of
physical objects, and that difference justifies us in claiming that Mbeliefs ought not be held accountable to the kind of intersubjective criticism properly imposed on sense-perceptual beliefs. Thomas Torrance,
another religious apologist who wields the Ontological Principle to
defend religious belief, writes,
It is always the nature of things that must prescribe for us the
specific mode of rationality that we must adopt toward them,
and prescribe also the form of verification apposite to them, and
therefore it is a major part of scientific activity to reach clear con-
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victions as to the distinctive nature of what we are seeking to
know in order that we may develop and operate with the distinctive categories demanded of us. 8

As Alston employs the Ontological Principle to defend religious experience as a source of justified belief about God, Torrance employs that
principle to defend revelation as a source of justified belief about God.
Canonically put, the Ontological Principle is the claim that,
(OP): the characteristics of an object ought to constrain the
norms an agent employs to evaluate the beliefs she forms
about that object.
Several notes by way of exposition. First, the Ontological Principle,
as formulated, is completely general. It applies to beliefs about objects of
any sort, not just to beliefs formed about God. So, although religious
apologists may, and do, employ it to happy effect, those concerned with
the epistemic imperialism visited upon non-religious ways of forming
beliefs are free to do the same. (I believe that a fuller appreciation of OP
would render disputes central to the philosophy of social science and of
mind more fruitful.)
Second, by object, I do not only mean an independently existing, discrete entity, of the sort paradigmatically exemplified by the typical chair,
banana, etc. Mental states are "objects" about which agents form beliefs,
as are social institutions, none of which exist independently of human
cognizers, and yet their distinctive ontological makeup imposes constraints on the way a rational agent forms beliefs about them. By object,
then, I mean the subject matter about which an agent forms beliefs, or
even more prosaically, whatever it is about which an agent forms beliefs.
Third, characteristics should be understood broadly, to include not just
the ontological makeup of an object of belief, the stuff of which it is composed, but also the form that stuff takes. 9 Birds and plants may be composed of the same stuff, but, because that stuff is organized very differently in plants than in animals, the way in which a rational agent forms
beliefs about them differs significantly. This becomes particularly important when we concern ourselves with the way we ought to form beliefs
about God. The characteristics of God which impose constraints on us
are not just, though they certainly include, God's incorporeal nature and
God's transcendence; they also include the ways in which God has decided to communicate information otherwise unknowable to us. That is,
they include the intentions and purposes God, as a free agent, pursues.
Fourth, the characteristics of an object constrain the norms an agent
ought to employ to evaluate her beliefs, but they do not determine exactly what those norms are. Only some of the norms which are improperly
employed to evaluate the epistemic status of a given type of belief are
rendered improper by the object's nature and characteristics. Some are
improper because, for example, an agent does not have access to the
cognitive apparatus which is a condition of forming beliefs in the way
required by a given norm. (In the terminology developed later, both
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practice- and object-imposed constraints exclude epistemic norms.)
Fifth, to affirm of a norm that it is improperly employed to evaluate
beliefs of a certain sort is not to claim that beliefs of that sort are subject to
entirely different norms than those proper to other practices. It is to
claim that there are some legitimate differences between one practice and
others, not that the former is absolutely different from the latter. All
practices, for example, are no doubt subject to the laws of logic; every
practice which gives rise to massive amounts of self-contradictory beliefs
cannot be reliable and thus is epistemically out of bounds. Amongst the
norms internal to the overrider systems of distinct doxastic practices,
then, there will be similarity and difference, unity and plurality.
As I noted above, neither Torrance nor Alston provide a rationale for
OP; they rely on its intuitive power, even though it plays a crucial role in
their apologetic agenda. I will present a rationale for that principle, and,
briefly, indicate the way in which it may be employed to diffuse comparison criticisms of religious belief.

v
Before articulating a rationale for OP, I will present several examples I
hope will render plausible the claim that some such principle is true
(whether or not I have successfully identified what that is.)
Suppose that I saw a Venus Flytrap in the forest and I tell you about it,
but you don't believe me. I can verify my belief if I retrace my steps until
we return to the location at which I claim to have seen the Flytrap. If we
cannot find the plant, witness no signs of its removal, and are not delusional or otherwise incapacitated, my claim to have seen the plant will
have been compromised. If, however, I claim to have seen a rare species
of bird, you don't believe that I have, you insist on returning to the location at which I claim to have seen the bird, you direct your attention to
the very branch on which the bird was resting when I saw it, refuse to
grant that my belief is true, and cite as grounds that the bird is not where
I said it was, you are simply being unreasonable. Why? Plants are stationary; birds move. You insist on employing procedures to substantiate
bird-beliefs that are proper to plant-beliefs and the like. We reasonably
investigate claims about the latter in ways it would be irrational to investigate the former just because the first kind of object interacts with our
cognitive faculties in a different way than does the second.
Consider another example. If there is a God, God is not a physical
object. If there is a planet orbiting Alpha Centauri, it is a physical object.
In virtue of God's essentially incorporeal nature, God can not reflect
light. In virtue of its corporeal nature, the planet orbiting Alpha Centauri
can. If we want to determine whether or not there is a planet orbiting
Alpha Centauri, we hire an astronomer with an unbelievably powerful
telescope; if the telescope is powerful enough, the astronomer skilled
enough, and there actually is a planet there, she will detect it. If she doesn't, we conclude that Alpha Centauri is planetless. But no matter how
powerful the telescope, no matter how assiduously the astronomer
scours the heavens, she cannot expect to detect God amongst the celestial
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beings she perceives. If she does not detect God, and thus concludes on
that basis that the universe is godless, she is irrational.
Of course, not every example is as clear cut as are those mentioned in
the previous paragraphs. For another example, and a more controversial one, consider the longstanding debate between those who believe
that human actions are events of a sort different than human behaviors
and that the properties making for that difference impose constraints on
the way that we form beliefs about actions, constraints from which we
are free when forming beliefs about bodily movements. I can determine
without having any knowledge of an agent's intentions or beliefs
whether or not water is poured from her hand on to her child's head; I
cannot determine without access to her beliefs and intentions whether or
not she is baptizing her baby. Because an agent's beliefs determine in
part which action she performs, those who form beliefs about another
agent's actions must have access to the latter's beliefs. The observer
needs to find some way to determine what the actor's beliefs are and
that cannot be accomplished merely by observing the relevant agent's
physical movements. Thus, in order reliably to form beliefs about an
agent's actions, we need to interpret (understand, empathize with, etc.)
what that agent does, where interpretation (understanding, empathizing, etc.) is a very different kind of cognitive activity than that in which
we must engage in order reliably to form beliefs about an agent's physical movements. Once again, because of a relevant difference between
two objects of belief (in this case, two events), the epistemic desiderata
proper to beliefs formed about one object properly differ from those
formed about the other.
It seems to me that Charles Taylor, in his many writings on the philosophy of social science, theory of interpretation, etc. employs - without explicitly articulating, so far as I can tell - the Ontological Principle
in defending the legitimacy of a non-scientistic approach to the way in
which we form beliefs about human action. According to Taylor,
human beings are very different kinds of entities than are, say, lemmings. Human beings are self-interpreting animals, because our beliefs
about ourselves determine in part who we are and what we are. IO
Lemmings lack beliefs about themselves, and hence none of their characteristics depend on their beliefs. This difference has great importance,
according to Taylor, for the kind of checks and constraints we employ to
evaluate theories about human agents and those we employ to evaluate
theories about lemmings. l1 Because human beings are self-interpreting
animals, the theories that a scientist forms about a human being can
change the way a human being thinks of herself, thus altering the object
of study in a way that the scientist doesn't alter the lemming when she
studies it. As a consequence, the kind of exact prediction proper to theories in the hard sciences is not properly expected of beliefs in the social
sciences. 12 Hence, it would be unreasonable to reject a theory formed
about persons because it does not admit of disconfirmation through
failed prediction. Rather, disconfirmation of social scientific theories
ought to be evaluated in light of criteria internal to hermeneutics.13 To
require of theories about self-interpreting animals that they be subject to
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the kinds of checks properly imposed on natural scientific theories
would be imperialistic. 14
VI

Each of the preceding scenarios exemplifies the Ontological Principle
in action. Epistemic desiderata proper to one doxastic practice are
rejected as imperialistic impositions on another, and at the heart of the
rationale for such rejection is a recognition of the epistemic relevance of
some difference between the objects of belief. Illustrations are helpful,
but are there principled considerations supporting the Ontological
Principle? I think that there are.
If we are to form our beliefs in such a way as to achieve our central
epistemic aim, viz., to achieve a high ratio of true to false beliefs, we
must acquire information about the objects of our belief. The beliefs we
form about an object must be generated from information about that
object if our believing truly is not to be a lucky accident and thus a failure to discharge our central epistemic aim. We engage in various practices by which we gather information and thereby form beliefs: senseperception, testimony, introspection, memory. Constructed as she is,
the typical human being is capable of acquiring information about
objects in her vicinity via the stimulation of her visual receptors by light
generated or reflected by those objects, of her auditory receptors by
sound waves reflected by those objects, of her olfactory receptors by
odoriferous particles emitted by those objects, etc. Our five senses are
not our only sources of information. We acquire information about our
feelings, beliefs, desires, and the like not by sensory stimulation but by
introspecting. And although memory and testimony are parasitic on
other belief-forming practices for their inputs, and thus are not basic
sources of beliefs, they are basic sources of epistemic justification. IS That
is, memory and testimony are sources of information inaccessible to an
agent unless she engages in those practices.
To be sure, if there are some objects discoverable by a sixth sense forever unattainable by those endowed with a constitution like ours, then it
is impossible for us reliably to form beliefs about those objects. If some
kinds of emotion are detectable only by the empathetic powers enjoyed
by (so far as we know) science fictional characters, then agents (like us)
who lack those powers are unable to acquire trustworthy information
about those kinds of emotion. Although by rank speculation we may
happen upon some truth or two, the means at our disposal are not conducive to an agent's discharging her central epistemic obligation with
respect to those emotions.
That we are capable of engaging in certain practices but not others,
then, imposes constraints on the way in which we can form beliefs. As
finite epistemic agents, we can engage only in certain practices and thus
may reliably form beliefs about only certain kinds of things. A bit of terminological legerdemain: I shall call any such constraint a practiceimposed constraint. A practice-imposed constraint is any limitation on
the way in which an agent can acquire information to which she is sub-
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ject in virtue of the belief-forming practices available (or unavailable) to
her.
There are various sources of practice-imposed constraints. The most
important source is an agent's constitution. Those outfitted with a wellfunctioning visual apparatus but not the means to form beliefs via sonar
cannot form beliefs in the way that bats form beliefs. Human beings
form beliefs about other people's beliefs principally by relying on testimony; those with the capacity to read minds are not so limited. Of
course, an agent's constitution may be both extended and altered. An
agent may employ her visual apparatus to form beliefs about subatomic
particles by employing an electron microscope, a possibility foreclosed
to those without the requisite technology. Those who enjoy the fruits of
such technological sophistication have open to them possibilities inaccessible to the less fortunate. And it is but a short step from extending
an agent's physical constitution to altering it. Perhaps future scientists,
either via genetic engineering or some drastic operation, will be able to
equip human beings with the ability to generate beliefs via sonar in
addition to their normal visual capacities. The moral of the story is simply that every cognitive agent (save perhaps God) is subject to practiceimposed constraints but that we ought not be too confident about what
those limitations are.
For certain of our core doxastic practices, the transmission of the
information from that about which we form beliefs to our capacities
requires that we be causally related to those objects. In order to acquire
the information required to form our beliefs reliably, we must enter into
causal relations of some sort with that about which we form beliefs.l(, (I
realize that these are treacherous waters, but there is nothing for it but to
swim on, leaving the requisite qualifications for another venue.) Our
intuitions about particular doxastic practices bears this out. Whatever
the difficulties of the causal theory of perception, that an agent is causally related to the object putatively perceived is a necessary condition of
any genuine perception of that object. An agent who forms a true belief
about an object 0 on the basis of sensory impressions which accurately
represent 0 does not succeed in perceiving 0, and thus in reliably forming a perceptual belief about 0, if 0 does not playa suitable causal role
in the generation of her belief. Thus, suppose that I am seated in front
of a large black-bellied stove, that I am having a visual experience as of
such a stove, an experience generated by the stimulation of my visual
receptors by light reflected from that stove, and that I thereby form the
belief that there is in fact a large stove in front of me. So long as nothing
bizarre occurs in the transpiring of those events, I no doubt form my
belief reliably; so long as I have no reason to believe that anything fishy
is going on, and so long as nothing fishy in fact occurs, I can hardly be
anything but justified in forming beliefs as I do. But if someone, unbeknownst to me, slips an incredibly lifelike painting of the stove in
between me and the stove, so that my visual perception of the painting
gives rise to a visual experience phenomenologically indistinguishable
from the visual experience I would have had when actually perceiving
the stove, then I can hardly be said to be perceiving the stove and cer-
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tainly not forming my beliefs reliably. The break in the causal chain
originating with the stove and terminating in the stimulation of my sensory faculties precludes my having the kind of purchase on an object
requisite for information gathering and thus reliable belief formation.
Similarly with other DPs. Suppose that ego stoked the fire in the potbellied stove, that alter saw him stoke the stove, that as a consequence
alter believed that he stoked the stove, and that alter continues to believe
the same because she remembers that ego stoked the stove. Once again,
barring bizarre circumstances, alter no doubt forms her beliefs reliably
and justifiably. If, however, alter's memory of the event was wiped out
as a consequence of severe brain damage suffered in a car accident, a
further consequence of which is that she seems to recall vividly many
events which never in fact occurred, and if alter recalls vividly that ego
in fact stoked the stove, but does so as a consequence of her abnormal
neurophysiological condition, then she has not in fact formed her beliefs
about that event reliably. The requisite causal connection between past
events and present recollection has been severed, rendering unreliable
what would normally have been a reliable indication of the truth.
Or suppose that ego stoked the stove and mentioned that fact to several other folks who related the story to alter, who thereby formed the
belief that ego stoked the fire. So long as the "transmission chain" linking alter to ego wends its way through the requisite competent authorities, alter's belief most likely enjoys justification. 17 Suppose, however,
that during the transmission of testimonial authority, an English speaker
fully in mastery of her native language, utters to a French speaker that
"Ego stoked the stove." If the latter lacks the capacity to understand any
language other than her own, she cannot testify authoritatively to the
claim that ego stoked the stove. Suppose that the French speaker enjoys
the way "Ego stoked the stove" sounds, and persists in repeating it
whenever she is addressed by English speakers. If alter happens to see
her, and believes that she knows something about the event in question,
and thus asks her if Ego stoked the stove (in English), and if our French
speaker responds by uttering the sounds liE go stoked the stove," the
belief that alter forms thereby does not count as epistemically justified.
Although there is a connection of some sort between ego's stoking the
fire and alter's believing that ego stoked the fire, the connection is not of
the appropriate sort; it is not the sort of causal connection between the
object of belief and the believer which undergirds our testimonial DP.
So, then, if an agent is to form beliefs reliably, she must be capable of
acquiring information about the object of her beliefs. The ways she has of
requiring information are constrained by the DPs available to her. In
order for the DPs available to her to enable her to acquire information, she
must be causally related in an appropriate way to the object of her belief.
No causal relation results in no information, and thus arbitrary belief.
If the ways in which we can reliably form beliefs are constrained by
the kinds of causal underpinnings internal to the DPs available to us,
they are further constrained by the kinds of causal relationships into
which different objects of belief can enter. Given that human beings
have the capacity visually to perceive physical objects, the characteristics
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of different physical objects constrain the ways in which human beings
can reliably form beliefs about those objects. Birds move around a lot;
plants are stationary. In virtue of that difference, beliefs formed about
birds must be checked very differently than those about plants. It isn't
possible for an actual human being reliably to form beliefs about both
birds and plants if she insists on checking both kinds of belief by
employing the same set of procedures. Reliable belief formation is constrained by the characteristics of the object of belief.
Consider another example. Suppose that there exists a very strange
artifact, the Holy Grail, which has the property that any cognitive agent
who perceives that object is afflicted with permanent amnesia about its
existence and location upon forming any belief about it. In virtue of its
having that property, the Grail would be unable to enter into those causal
relations partly constitutive of both our mnemonic and testimonial DPs.
Clearly any objects about which we have amnesia are those about which
we can form no reliable memory beliefs. And any object which no-one
can remember is one to which no-one can testify. No doubt the Grail
remains "undiscovered" because it has some such property.
Defenders of MP, like Alston, will be quick to point out that God, if
God exists, cannot reflect light, emit odors, resist the touch of a hand,
reflect sound waves; hence God cannot be tasted, seen, smelled, heard or
touched.
Some more terminological legerdemain. An object-imposed constraint is a limitation on the way in which cognitive agents of a certain
sort can reliably form beliefs about a certain kind of object, a limitation
which obtains because of the kind of causal interactions into which that
object's characteristics enable (or do not enable) that object to enter.
VII

Reliable belief-formation requires causal connection of some sort
between objects and agents with the requisite causal properties. So long as
it is possible for an agent to form beliefs about an object reliably (e.g., agentimposed constraints do not render that object inaccessible), then any epistemic norm which requires of an agent that she enter into causal relations
with that object into which she cannot enter because of object-imposed constraints is epistemically indefensible. And this for two reasons.
First, to require of an agent that she forms beliefs about an object in a
reliable manner whilst evaluating her actions in light of epistemic norms
which presuppose that she can enter into causal relations with that
object into which she cannot enter is to require the impossible. But
ought implies can; it is irrational to require of an agent that she perform
an action she cannot perform. Hence, any norm which presupposes of
an agent that she can enter into causal relations into which she cannot
enter is irrational. Rather, an epistemic norm is rationally defensible
only if it requires of an agent that she perform those actions it is possible
for her to perform.
To require of an agent that she evaluate bird-beliefs in light of the
checking procedures apposite to the checking of plant-beliefs presup-
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poses that she can enter into the kind of causal relationship to birds
which is a condition of the possibility of reliably forming beliefs about
plants. But because birds move around a lot, no actual human being can
relate to birds like she can relate to plants. (Unless, of course, the birds
about which she forms beliefs are deceased.) Similarly, to require of
beliefs about God that they be based upon grounds of the sort on which
we ought to base our beliefs about planetary objects would be to require
of an agent that she enter into causal relations with God she cannot,
quite literally, in the nature of the case enter. God, not being a physical
object, cannot reflect light and thus cannot stimulate our visual apparatus in the manner appropriate to planets and stars.
Second, it is unreasonable to require of agents who engage in a DP
that they adhere to norms in light of which the beliefs so formed cannot
but be judged as epistemically unjustified, even if those beliefs have
been highly reliably formed. The norms in light of which we evaluate
our beliefs must be sufficiently sensitive to enable us to detect whether
those beliefs have been reliably formed or not - what other epistemologically sound justification could we produce for such a norm?
Evaluating beliefs formed in a DP in light of norms they cannot but fail
even if that DP is reliable is hardly an adequate way of discriminating
between reliably and unreliably formed beliefs! But this is precisely
what the critic does when she does not allow "the characteristics of the
object to constrain how cognitive agents form beliefs about that object./I
Even if an agent is forming beliefs about an object in the appropriate
manner, and thus is causally related to the object of belief in the manner
apposite to objects and agents of that kind, the critic requires of her that
she adhere to norms which would rule reliably formed beliefs out of
epistemic bounds. To rig the game so that it is impossible for beliefs
formed in a practice - even if reliable - to pass evaluative muster lacks
any epistemic merit.
What is the relevance of the two previous points to the status of the
Ontological Principle? If certain norms lack epistemic merit because
they require of an agent that she perform the impossible, and if what is
impossible by way of reliable belief formation is determined in part by
an object's characteristics (capacity to fly, incorporeality, essential subjectivity, etc), then the fact that certain norms lack epistemic merit is a
consequence, in part, of an object's characteristics. But that is just a
longwinded way of claiming that the Ontological Principle is true.
Let me sum up by laying out in its essentials the argument in support
of the Ontological Principle.
0)

In order reliably to form beliefs about a given object, an agent
must acquire information about that object.

(2)

In order to acquire information about a given object, an agent
must be causally connected to that object.

(3)

Hence, in order reliably to form beliefs about a given object,
an agent must be causally connected to that object.
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(4)

In order for an agent to be causally related to a given object,
that object must have the requisite causal properties and
she must have access to the requisite doxastic practices.

(5)

Hence, in order for an agent reliably to form beliefs about a
given object, that about which she forms beliefs must have
the requisite causal properties and she must have access to
the requisite doxastic practices. (Reliable belief-formation
requires causal connection between objects and agents.)

(6)

If reliable belief-formation requires causal connection
between objects and agents, then any epistemic norm which
requires of an agent that she enter into causal relations into
which she cannot enter, whether because of practice or
object-imposed constraints, is epistemically indefensible.

(7)

Hence, any epistemic norm which requires of an agent
that she enter into causal relations in which she cannot
enter is epistemically indefensible.

(8)

If the causal relations into which an agent can enter are
determined in part by the nature of a putative object of
belief, whether or not an epistemic norm is epistemically
defensible depends in part upon the nature of that about
which an agent forms beliefs.

(9)

Hence, whether or not an epistemic norm is defensible
depends in part upon the nature of that about which an
agent forms beliefs.
VIII

Return to the topic with which we began this essay. Comparison criticism
of religious belief proceeds by way of (1) identifying those practices at the
core of our cognitive life, (2) isolating those features of our core practices
which account for their reliability, and (3) determining whether or not other
practices which ought to have those features have at least their functional
equivalents. The danger with this kind of argument is that we risk imposing
on one practice the expectations legitimately required only of other practices.
Otherwise put, the drawback with comparison criticism is that we have a
very difficult time determining whether or not a feature indicating reliability
for one practice indicates unreliability for those which lack that feature.
The Ontological Principle provides us with some principled guidance for
resolving disputes over that matter. Reliable belief-formation requires causal
connection between knower and known. Because different kinds of object
enter into different kinds of causal relation, the kind of relationship between
knower and known required for reliable belief-formation varies from one
practice to another. We may determine whether or not a given epistemic
norm is properly imposed on a given practice by asking (1) is it possible for

RATIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

167

an agent who forms beliefs about an object to enter into a causal relationship
with that object of the sort presupposed by the norm in question?; and (2)
would an agent who adhered to that norm be forced to conclude that she
was forming beliefs inappropriately whether or not she was in fact forming
her beliefs reliably? If "no" in the first case and "yes" in the second, then the
norm in question lacks epistemic merit.
And this provides the apologist with a strategy for defending religious practices from comparison criticism. Faced with such a critique,
and thus with the claim that a practice lacks features it ought to have if it
is to provide access to the truth, the apologist may show that the deficiency seized upon by the critic as an indication of unreliability is a legitimate difference in virtue of its being a natural consequence of the
nature of that about which she forms beliefs. The "deficiency" is in fact
a legitimate difference; things may be going just as they epistemically
ought if God is as practitioners of that practice believe God is.

IX
I do not want to pretend that all of the issues raised in this essay have
been resolved successfully. There are numerous questions which remain.
Three are crucially important. First, are there more general grounds for
the claim that reliable belief-formation requires a causal relation between
subject and object other than the ad hoc considerations I mentioned
above? For example, could we show that at least de re belief requires
causal relations between believer and believed since, to believe anything
of an object at all, an agent must be able to refer to that object, and the reference of de re beliefs is fixed by causal relations of some sort?
Second, the causal relation requirement only explains the legitimate
differences between the kinds of beliefs which require causal relations;
some kinds of belief do not seem to require causal relations and yet the
doxastic practices on the basis of which we form these beliefs are legitimately different from other doxastic practices. How do we account for
those legitimate differences? Moral knowledge would not seem to
require of an agent that she be causally related to some object; hence we
cannot explain the difference between the way in which we ought to
form moral beliefs and the way we ought to form sense-perceptual
beliefs by appeal to some difference in the causal properties of the
objects of moral beliefs and those of sense-perceptual beliefs.
Third, does employment of the Ontological Principle risk epistemic
anarchy? If the nature of an object constrains the way we ought to form
beliefs about it, who is in a position to determine what the nature of a
given object is? Trivially, only those who form beliefs about it. But that
means that the very people who have a vested interest in the epistemic
respectability of some doxastic practice determine which standards are
appropriately employed to evaluate that practice (albeit indirectly). And
that is problematic because it would inhibit any significant external critique of a given doxastic practice.
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1.
Thus, it seems to me that the most interesting of the supposed conflicts between "religion and science" hinge on some supposed difference
between the way in which scientists form their beliefs and the way religious
believers form their beliefs; the conflicts that get the most press, like the creation-evolution debate, hinge on a putative incompatibility between religious doctrines and the assured results of modern science, but are of comparative unimportance because the religious tradition party to the incompatibility can always revise their theological truth-claims. It is only when that
kind of revision is impossible that the conflict between science and religion
can seem intractable.
2.
William Alston, "The Perception of God," in Philosophical Topics 16
(Fall, 1988): 30.
3.
As is argued by C.B. Martin in Religious Belief, (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1959), pp. 64-94; Charles Daniels, "Experiencing God," in
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49/3 (March, 1989): 489-499;
Anthony O'Hear, Experience, Explanation and Faith: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Religion, (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1984), pp. 25-55;
David Conway, "Mavrodes, Martin, and the Verification of Religious
Experience," in The International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 2/3
(Fall, 1971): 156-71.
4.
William Alston, "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," in The
International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 31 (June, 1992): 71.
5.
Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, (Ithaca, NY.:
Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 216.
6.
Perceiving God, p. 218.
7.
Perceiving God, p. 219
8.
Theological Science, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. viii.
Cf. pp. 168-69. Torrance is more self-conscious about his employment of the
Ontological Principle than is Alston. Thus, Torrance writes, "the fundamental principle that I have been concerned with is a very simple one, but its
implications are deep and far-reaching when worked out consistently over
the whole range of human knowledge. We know things in accordance with
their natures, or what they are in themselves; and so we let the nature of
what we know to determine for us the content and form of our knowledge."
The Ground and Grammar of Theology, (Charlottesville, VA.: University Press
of Virginia, 1980), p. 8.
9.
Torrance and Alston both claim that an object's nature does the constraining. But unless God's intentions, and more specifically, God's chosen
mode of communication, are part of God's nature, then both Alston and
Torrance assume that it is more than just God's nature that constrains the
way we ought to form beliefs about God. More accurate, though less stylish, is characteristic. Whenever J use "nature," I intend to be understood as
meaning "characteristic."
10. "A fully competent human being not only has some understanding
(which may be also more of less misunderstanding) of himself, but is partly constituted by this understanding....Our self-understanding essentially incorporates
our seeing ourselves against a background of what I have called 'strong evaluation,"' that is, a set of "distinctions between things which are recognized as of
categoric or unconditioned or higher importance or worth, and things which
lack this or are or lesser value." Charles Taylor, "Introduction," in Human
Agency and Language, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 19.
Taylor explains what he means by strong evaluation in Sources of the Self,
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(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 3-52, especially pp. 19f... and
30f.; and what he means by the self-constitutive nature of human personhood in
"Self-Interpreting Animals," in Human Agency and Language, pp. 45- 76.
11. Naturalistic science, according to Taylor, aspires to explain human
action "absolutely," that is, without taking into account properties which exist
only in the experience of human beings (e.g., secondary qualities, self-conceptions). Continuing the train of thought quoted in the previous footnote,
Taylor writes, "A being who exists only in self-interpretation cannot be understood absolutely; and one who can only be understood against the background of distinctions of worth [strong evaluations] cannot be captured by a
scientific language which essentially aspires to neutrality. Our personhood
cannot be treated scientifically in exactly the same way we approach our
organic being. What it is to possess a liver or heart is something I can define
quite independently of the space of questions in which I exist for myself, but
not what it is to have a self or be a person." "Introduction," pp. 3-4.
12. Cf. "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," in Philosophy and the
Human Sciences, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 55f; and
"Social Theory as Practice," in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, pp. 91-10l.
13. "Social Theory as Practice," p. 111; "Interpretation and the Sciences
of Man," p. 53.
14. To multiply examples further would be tedious, but not impossible.
John Searle, it seems to me, uses the Ontological Principle to defend his
account of the nature of the human mind. "In spite of our modern arrogance
about how much we know, in spite of the assurance and universality of our
science, where the mind is concerned we are characteristically confused and in
disagreement. We let our research methods dictate the subject matter, rather
than the converse. Like the drunk who loses his car keys in the dark bushes
but looks for them under the streetlight, 'because the light is better there," we
try to find out how humans might resemble out computational models rather
than trying to figure out how the conscious human mind actually works. I am
frequently asked, 'But how could you study consciousness scientifically? How
could there be a theory?'" The Rediscovery of the Mind, (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1992), p. 247. The parallel with the religious question is obvious. Again,
"the epistemology of studying the mental no more determines its ontology
than does the epistemology of any other discipline determine its ontology. On
the contrary, in the study of the mind as elsewhere, the whole point of the epistemology is to get at the pre-existing ontology." Ibid., p. 23.
15. Robert Audi, Belief, Justification and Knowledge, (Belmont, CA.:
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1983), p. 38.
16. The locution "causal relations of some sort" is intentionally vague; I
claim only that reliable belief-formation requires causal connection between
knower and known without committing myself to any particular analysis of
causation, nor to an account of the different kinds of causation apposite to
different kinds of belief-formation. I have no idea what difference there is
between the kind of causal connection properly obtaining between an event
that occurs in the past and an agent who recalls that event, and the kind of
causal relation properly obtaining between a crater in the moon and an agent
who sees that crater. I suppose that identifying those differences falls to
physiologists, psychologists and other types of scientist. My point is simply
that an agent who is causally connected to a given object in no way, shape, or
form cannot form beliefs about that object in a reliable, responsible manner.
17. C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992).

